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In the summer of 1942, the East Coast bore witness to an aberration when a German submarine appeared in
the waters off Long Island, seemingly countless miles from the bitter fighting and utter carnage engulfing
Europe.1 Only four days later, another submarine unexpectedly surfaced, this time near Ponte Vedra Beach off
the coast of Florida.2 The United States, historically protected from its enemies abroad by the vast stretches of
the mighty Atlantic, now found itself exposed to the Unterseeboote that had once provoked the superpower
into world war.3 The submarines harbored agents of the notorious German spy organization known as the
Abwehr; and while these agents‘ ultimate capture epitomized the failure of many German intelligence
operations in the United States, their activity reaffirmed American fears of Nazi spies and American
subversives within. Beyond its immediate impact, Operation PASTORIUS inadvertently led the United States
government to reflect on the legal treatment of its enemies—an issue that, more than sixty years later, remains
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The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in America 
By Robert Kellert 
 
In the summer of 1942, the East Coast bore 
witness to an aberration when a German submarine 
appeared in the waters off Long Island, seemingly 
countless miles from the bitter fighting and utter 
carnage engulfing Europe.
1
 Only four days later, 
another submarine unexpectedly surfaced, this time 
near Ponte Vedra Beach off the coast of Florida.
2
 
The United States, historically protected from its 
enemies abroad by the vast stretches of the mighty 
Atlantic, now found itself exposed to the 
Unterseeboote that had once provoked the 
                                                 
1
 Albert L. Cox, "The Saboteur Story," Records of 
the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, D.C. 57/59, 16.   
2
 Leon O. Prior, "Nazi Invasion of Florida!," The 
Florida Historical Quarterly 49 no. 2 (Oct., 1970): 129. 
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superpower into world war.
3
 The submarines 
harbored agents of the notorious German spy 
organization known as the Abwehr; and while these 
agents‘ ultimate capture epitomized the failure of 
many German intelligence operations in the United 
States, their activity reaffirmed American fears of 
Nazi spies and American subversives within. 
Beyond its immediate impact, Operation 
PASTORIUS inadvertently led the United States 
government to reflect on the legal treatment of its 
enemies—an issue that, more than sixty years later, 
remains to be resolved.    
The Abwehr, whose name is derived from 
the German word for ―defense,‖ was hardly a 
defensive organization. A military intelligence 
                                                 
3
 Millett, Allan, and Peter Maslowski. For the 
Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America, (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 347.  
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agency spearheaded by the ―almost legendary‖ 
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr flourished 
under the leadership of Canaris, who made it 
immediately clear—as early as 1935—that the 
United States would be ―‗one of the [Abwehr‘s] key 
targets.‘‖4  
The United States, adhering to its 
isolationist doctrine and in the midst of an economic 
depression, still seemed to threaten Germany‘s 
interests in the near future. Nazi Germany appeared 
both aware of, and concerned with, America‘s 
ability to exert its diplomatic and military influence 
on the world stage six years before its entrance into 
World War II. Canaris, for one, recognized the 
―‗capacity of its [America‘s] industrial power‘‖ to 
                                                 
4
 Canaris, as quoted in Ladislas Farago, The Game of 
the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the 
United States and Great Britain During World War II (New 
York: David McKay Company, 1971), 27.  
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―‗assure victory.‘‖5 Thus, responding to the earliest 
portents of global conflict, Germany was preparing 
its spy war—its quiet war—against the United 
States. 
Ironically, Admiral Canaris personally 
opposed Adolf Hitler‘s regime.6 Brutal mass 
executions following the Nazis‘ Blitzkrieg against 
Poland in 1938 had prompted Canaris to question 
Hitler‘s intentions in occupying Poland. He 
demanded an explanation for the ―outrages‖ 
committed there by the Nazis, fearing that the world 
would ―‗eventually blame the Wehrmacht‘‖ for 
merely carrying out ―‗these unheard-of atrocities‘‖ 
                                                 
5
 Canaris, as quoted in Ibid.  
6
 Hans L. Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence 
in the United States, 1935-1945," The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review 42 no. 1 (June, 1955): 85.  
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of Hitler‘s personal ambitions.7 The prevalent 
German ―monstrosity‖ in Poland, coupled with 
Hitler‘s willingness to go to war against England—
whose potential future support from the United 
States ―frightened‖ Canaris—cemented tensions 
between the admiral and his Führer.
8
 Nevertheless, 
Canaris had to perform his duty—if not for the 
Führer, then for Germany.  
Canaris and the Abwehr were far from alone 
in Germany‘s intelligence services, however. The 
Sicherheitdeinst (―security service‖) and 
Reichsicherheitshauptamt (―main security agency of 
the [German] empire,‖ also known as the R.S.H.A.) 
supplemented one another while the Luftwaffe even 
maintained its own research office, specializing in 
                                                 
7
 Canaris, as quoted in Farago, The Game of the 
Foxes, 170. 
8
 Ibid., 171. 
 228 
―signal intelligence.‖9 Despite this extensive 
intelligence bureaucracy, whose very intricacy 
likely hampered the efficiency of gathering and 
transmitting reliable intelligence, the Abwehr took 
the lead in initiating espionage in the United 
States.
10
 The United States also had secret designs, 
however, and stood as ready to infiltrate Germany 
with its own spies as it was to intercept Nazi 
saboteurs in American territory. 
Admiral Canaris had an equally shrewd 
American counterpart in William Donovan, head of 
the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). The 
precursor to the C.I.A., the O.S.S. emerged from a 
primitive intelligence agency, the Office of the 
                                                 
9
 Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the 
United States, 1935-1945," 85. 
10
 Thomas H. Etzold, "The (F)utility Factor: German 
Information Gathering in the United States, 1933-1941," 
Military Affairs 39 no. 2 (Apr., 1975): 77. 
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Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), which 
Donovan had also directed.
11
 Following America‘s 
entry into World War II, the propaganda wing of the 
C.O.I. separated from the organization and the 
C.O.I. thereafter became the Office of War 
Information; it was soon renamed the Office of 
Strategic Services and placed under the watchful 
eye of William Donovan.
12
 
William Donovan hardly qualified as a 
mainstream intelligence director. A wealthy 
corporate lawyer of Republican persuasion, 
Donovan nonetheless had President Franklin 
Roosevelt‘s support in creating an ―international 
secret service‖ for the United States ―equal to the 
                                                 
11
 R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of 
America's First Central Intelligence Agency (University of 
California Press, 1972), 1. 
12
 Ibid., 2. 
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Nazi challenge.‖13  Even Roosevelt, who ―saved 
Donovan‘s bureaucratic life‖ on more than one 
occasion, purportedly warned, ―‗We must find a 
way to harness this guy, because if we don‘t he will 
be doing a lot of things other than what we want 
him to do.‘‖14 The Joint Chiefs concurred with 
Roosevelt, reluctant to bring Donovan‘s 
―propaganda machinery‖ into the military realm; 
they did, however, agree to absorb the O.S.S. 
without its propaganda wing.
15
 
The Joint Chiefs relegated Donovan‘s new 
organization to two primary functions: to ―‗collect 
and analyze such strategic information as may be 
required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff‘‖ and to ―‗plan 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 1. 
14
 Roosevelt, as quoted in David C. Martin, "OSS 
into CIA," Grand Street 2 no. 2 (Winter, 1983): 181. 
15
 Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR 
and World War II Espionage, (New York: Random House, 
2001), 187. 
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and operate such special services as may be 
directed.‘‖16  On June 13, 1942, President Roosevelt 
issued an executive order authorizing the creation of 
the O.S.S. Though empowered by this move, the 
savvy Donovan knew not to overstep his bounds: 
―‗[T]hese admirals and generals might be willing to 
sit down with citizen Donovan, but not with 
General Donovan.‘‖17  Colleague Allen Dulles 
sensed an ―indefatigable energy‖ and ―great 
resourcefulness‖ in the former World War I war 
hero, foreshadowing the remarkable creativity with 
which the O.S.S. would operate under Donovan‘s 
leadership.
18
    
                                                 
16
 Join Chiefs directive, as quoted in Martin, "OSS 
into CIA," 181. 
17
 Donovan, as quoted in Joseph E. Persico, 
Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage, 
187. 
18
 Dulles, as quoted in Smith, OSS, 2. 
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O.S.S. planning chief James Grafton Rogers 
reflected on the new agency with amusement, 
intrigue, and in a sense, fascination: 
The Office is the most interesting collection 
of people and their doings I have ever served 
in or known. Yale, the State Department, the 
old ―Sun,‖ the Cactus Club, the university at 
Boulder—all were less colorful. It may 
expire any minute. I feel every day is the 
last. The Joint Staff is trying to understand it 
and knows the ability collected and needed 
for some organization of organized and 
secret subversion. It recognizes R. and A. is 





Rogers‘s pithy description encapsulates the 
character of the O.S.S. Here was a body of 
incomparably diverse individuals working—
independently and in tandem—toward the same 
goal: a war of subversion. William Donovan had 
                                                 
19
 James Grafton Rogers, in Wartime Washington: 
The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers 1942-1943, 
ed. Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, MD: University Publications 
of America, 1987), 8. 
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every right to be cautious as the Joint Chiefs 
struggled to grasp the nature of this mysterious new 
intelligence agency, its capacity and its limitations. 
Donovan seemed to understand the fragility of the 
O.S.S. as well as anyone could have: until the 
agency could prove its worth, it had to tread 
cautiously. 
Of O.S.S. ―planning,‖ James Rogers noted: 
The work is like watching a kaleidoscope. 
The pattern is changed every morning. Bill 
Donovan dreams up something overnight 
perhaps. A mission to Brazil—need for an 
overall psychological warfare plan, a 
venture in North Africa, a revision of the 
whole O.S.S. show. I never wake up to see 




The O.S.S. operated extemporaneously; yet, this 
appeared to be one of its greatest assets. For 
William Donovan, rigidity inhibited innovation; and 
so the men of the O.S.S were encouraged to work as 
                                                 
20
 James Grafton Rogers, in Wartime Washington, 8. 
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pioneers, not as order-takers. As O.S.S. Colonel 
David Bruce remarked, ―‗Woe to the officer who 
turned down a project because, on its face, it 
seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual.‘‖21  
William Donovan infused his independence 
of mind into the O.S.S. Appreciated and respected 
within the O.S.S., Donovan sometimes met bitter 
resistance outside the organization. One of his most 
contentious relationships was with J. Edgar Hoover, 
of whom Donovan became a nominal boss 
following his appointment as Assistant Attorney 
General in 1924.
22
 By 1942, tensions between the 
two men had mounted, not dissipated. Concerned 
over whether Spain would remain neutral as the 
Allies prepared their invasion of North Africa, the 
O.S.S. authorized a mission to photograph ―cipher 
                                                 
21
 Bruce, as quoted in Smith, OSS, 3. 
22
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 94. 
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pads to [of?] the Spanish diplomatic code.‖23 As 
O.S.S. agents were opening the safe, FBI agents 
stormed the location, arrested the O.S.S. men and 
confiscated their stolen material, prompting 
Donovan to state, ―‗The Abwehr gets better 
treatment from the FBI than we do.‘‖24 The silent 
war between the Abwehr and the O.S.S. had begun; 
but in the meantime, the FBI was fighting its own 
war—not on the European mainland, but on the 
American home front. 
With a significant population of German-
Americans, the United States faced dissent from 
within. Unlike prior waves of immigrants, German 
immigrants in the twentieth century came to 
America driven more by ―material incentives‖ than 
                                                 
23
 Martin, "OSS into CIA," 180. 
24
 Donovan, as quoted in Ibid. 
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―democratic conviction.‖25 Still harboring pro-
German sentiments, millions of German-Americans 
resided in the land of one of Nazi Germany‘s most 
formidable foes.
26
 Organizations like the German-
American Bund, under the leadership of the 
National Socialists Bund‘s Fritz Gissibl and Sepp 
Schuster, sparked suspicion and concern over 
domestic subversion. Gissibl also helped found the 
ominously-named organization, ―Friends of New 
Germany.‖27   
Even more ominous was the prospect of 
radicals like Gissibl and Schuster returning to Nazi 
Germany. Both men, in fact, returned and founded 
                                                 
25
 Christof Mauch. The Shadow War Against Hitler: 
The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret 
Intelligence Service, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (New York: 




 Arthur L. Smith, Jr., "The Kameradschaft USA," 





 German intelligence 
organizations like the Abwehr thus had an 
accessible pool of disloyal Americans to facilitate, 
and participate in, their espionage operations in the 
United States.  
 The arrest of Carl Herman Schroetter on 
September 2, 1941, in Miami reinforced fears over a 
German ―fifth column‖ in America. Schroetter, born 
in Switzerland and educated in Germany, 
immigrated to the United States in 1913. He settled 
into an unsuspicious identity and operated the 
charter boat, Echo of the Past.
29
 Schroetter 
allegedly garnered and dispatched information 
―concerning the national defense‖ to Kurt Frederick 
Ludwig, a German agent operating out of New 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., 398. 
29
 Leon O. Prior, "German Espionage in Florida 
during World War II," The Florida Historical Quarterly 39 




 Schroetter‘s arrest proved even more 
symbolic than efficacious in the U.S.-Germany 
intelligence war: ―Schroetter‘s arrest emphasizes 
the alertness with which the FBI is maintaining its 
vigil against possible spies.‖31  
This deliberate statement, unlike others in 
the article, suggests that Americans became 
concerned about internal dangers and needed 
assurance that authorities like the FBI were doing 
all in their power to protect the American 
homeland. Federal Judge Henry W. Goddard 
sentenced Carl Schroetter to ten years in prison, half 
of Ludwig‘s sentence.32   
                                                 
30
 Prior, ―German Espionage in Florida during World 
War II," 374. 
31
 ―Over the Desk,‖ Miami Daily News, September 7, 
1941. 
32
 ―Spying Fun to Girl; Given Five Year Sentence,‖ 
Sarasota Herald-Tribune, March 20, 1942. 
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Curiously, Goddard also sentenced Lucy 
Boehmler, a high school student, to five years in 
―women‘s reformatory‖ at the Alderson Federal 
Prison in West Virginia for exclaiming that she 
―found espionage lots of fun.‖33 Boehmler had, in 
fact, accompanied Kurt Ludwig on his missions and 
assisted him in establishing contact with American 
military personnel, typically in army camps and 
nearby taverns.
34
 Upon further examination, it 
seems that Boehmler—hardly an innocent, 
―misguided‖ bystander—had actually facilitated 
Nazi intelligence operations in the U.S. that led to 
the sinking of ―allied ships sailing from New 
                                                 
33
 Boehmler, as quoted in ―Spying Fun to Girl; Given 
Five Year Sentence.‖  
34
 Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the 
United States, 1935-1945," 90. 
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York.‖35 According to a government witness, the 
spy ring with which Boehmler associated herself 
relayed vital information that reached as high in the 




In light of these unfortunate details, 
especially, Judge Goddard‘s punishment seems not 
only appropriate, but also lenient, for the damage 
Boehmler helped inflict—without remorse—all in 
the spirit of ―fun.‖ Boehmler‘s actions underscore 
the tense wartime environment in 1940s America. 
Citizens who facilitated German espionage were 
feared and perhaps looked upon with even more 
contempt than German spies. For beyond being 
enemies of the state, American subversives had 
                                                 
35
 ―Allied Vessel Sinkings Laid to Nazi Spies,‖ 




betrayed their home, the beacon of opposition to 
Fascism and Communism alike, and defected to the 
nefarious interests of the fascist Nazi regime. 
Boehmler‘s anti-American activities establish the 
context so critical to evaluating both the real and 
perceived Nazi threats to the nation. For many 
American citizens, the threat of Nazi espionage was 
real; on several occasions, they were correct. Three 
unanticipated events in the coming two years were 
about to confirm their anxiety. 
German espionage had yielded only modest 
gains since the arrest and detainment of thirty-three 
Nazi agents following an FBI raid in July 1941.
37
  
The raid, declared “the nation‘s biggest spy suspect 
roundup,” hindered, but did not incapacitate, Nazi 
                                                 
37
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 184. 
 242 
intelligence-gathering in the United States.
38
 
Arraigned on charges of “acting as agents for a 
foreign government without so registering‖ and 
―conspiracy to transmit vital information to a 
foreign government,‖ twenty-three of the thirty-
three suspects pleaded not guilty.
39
 On January 2, 
1941, the suspects received an aggregate two 
hundred sixty-eight years of imprisonment, with the 
―heaviest‖ sentences of eighteen years given to 
Herman Lang, Edmund Carl Heine, and Frederick 
Joubert Duquesne—all native citizens—for relaying 
―details of the Norden bombsight to Germany.‖40  
Ironically, Germany‘s most threatening 
intelligence presence in America may have been its 
                                                 
38
 ―Seven Nazi Spies Admit Their Guilt,‖ The 
Evening Independent, July 18, 1941. 
39
 ―Eight Admit Guilt In U.S. Spy Trial; Others 
Remanded,‖ Ottowa Citizen, July 19, 1941.  
40
 ―33 Nazi Spies Sent to Prison,‖ Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, January 3, 1942. 
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most visible. German diplomatic officials alone 
offered German intelligence services unique 
vehicles for acquiring and delivering information—
a less suspicious method of gathering intelligence 
prevalent throughout history since the time of the 
Byzantine Empire.
41
 In many cases, clandestine 
intelligence agents merely confirmed information 
already acquired from German diplomats.
42
 
Overseeing clandestine operations, the 
Abwehr had, in fact, been ―up to its neck in 
sabotage operations in the United States‖ for quite 
some time.
43
 Despite setbacks such as the FBI raid 
in the summer of 1944, the Abwehr persisted with 
its operations in the ―lion‘s den.‖ Under pressure 
from Hitler to ―disrupt American armaments 
                                                 
41
 Etzold, "The (F)utility Factor: German Information 




 Farago, The Game of the Foxes, 432. 
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production,‖ Canaris authorized Operation 
PASTORIUS, named after one of Germany‘s first 
settlers in America, Franz Pastorius.
44
 In what 
Colonel Lahousen, the head of Abwehr‘s successor 
agency, Abwehr II, called ―‗the biggest blunder that 
ever occurred in Abwehr II,‘‖ eight German agents 
set out on a futile mission aimed at aluminum 
production sites—critical to the supply of American 
aircraft—in Philadelphia, Massena, New York, East 
St. Louis, Illinois and Alcoa, Tennessee.
45
   
Intriguingly, their more general mission was 
to incite American furor through acts of sabotage. 
Americans would consequently direct their outrage 
and suspicions toward German-Americans living in 
the United States, thus prompting them to form a 
                                                 
44
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 198. 
45
 Lahousen, as quoted in Ibid., 433. 
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―fifth column‖ movement within America.46 All 
eight agents had lived in the United States at one 
time; two were American citizens, reaffirming 
public concerns over subversive pro-German 
sympathizers residing in America.
47
 
Georg Dasch, Ernest Burger, Herbert Haupt, 
Edward Kerling, Richard Quirin, Hermann 
Neubauer, and Werner Thiel—all had left for 
Germany on their own volition, ―inspired by the 
glowing promise of the Third Reich.‖48 Nazi 
intelligence missions in the United States seemed to 
revolve around a few common objectives covering a 
gamut of vital American targets: 
 Track American advances in science and 
technology. 
 Assess American political trends and 
their impact on foreign policy.  
                                                 
46
 Leon O. Prior, "Nazi Invasion of Florida!," 130. 
47
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 199. 
48
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 199. 
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 Obtain information on tensions between 
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill (for 
exploitation).  
 Keep abreast of potential invasion plans.  
 Accurately estimate America‘s 
production figures and judge its fighting 
and logistics potentials accordingly. 
 Conduct sabotage, primarily for 
―creating bottlenecks in the American 
economy.‖49  
Operation PASTORIUS agents focused more on 
active sabotage than passive espionage, destruction 
more than observation. This correlated with a shift 
in German intelligence efforts after America‘s 
declaration of war; for Germany‘s most noteworthy 
and therefore likely more successful intelligence 
operations were primarily those of sabotage, not 
espionage.
50
 Aware of America‘s potential strength, 
Hitler sought to weaken America‘s production 
                                                 
49
 Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the 
United States, 1935-1945," 84-85. 
50
 Ibid., 85. 
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capacity; and so the agents prepared to oblige their 
Führer—for the time being.51  
The eight operatives were divided into two 
U-boats—one team led by Georg Dasch, the other 
by Edward Kerling.
52
 With $174,588 in American 
bills, the teams mobilized for their high-risk mission 
approved by Admiral Canaris, who immediately 
thereafter offered a foreboding caveat: ―This will 
cost these poor men their lives.‖53 Canaris, an 
apparent pragmatist often left at the whim of his 
impractical Führer, had few illusions regarding the 
mission‘s success; he could only oblige. 
Departing Continental Europe, eight agents 
of the fatherland set out on their task to breed chaos 
on the American mainland and sabotage ―aluminum 
                                                 
51
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 199. 
52
 Farago, The Game of the Foxes, 433. 
53
 Canaris, as quoted in Persico, Roosevelt's Secret 
War, 200. 
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and power plants, railroad right of ways and Ohio 
River locks.‖54 The agents had studied drawings of 
New York City‘s water supply system and even the 
hydroelectric plant at Niagara Falls.
55
 In their ―spare 
time,‖ they were to incite fear among the American 
population with explosives disguised as innocuous 
objects like ―fountain pens, and pencils, others 
briquettes of coal.‖56  
On June 13, under cover of darkness, U-202 
(the Innsbruck), carrying Georg Dasch and his 
team, came to a stop within 500 miles of the Long 
Island shore.
57
 The team was then paddled to the 
shore by some of the Innsbruck‘s crew, and set foot 
on a beach not far from Amagansett. As they buried 
gear they no longer needed, Dasch‘s team heard a 
                                                 
54
 Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 16. 
55
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 200. 
56
 Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 16. 
57
 Ibid., 18. 
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discomfiting shout of ―Who are you?‖ from John 
Cullen, a rookie Coast Guardsman.
58
 The foolhardy 
Dasch gave Cullen $260, and simply replied, 
―Forget about this.‖59 Cullen relayed his encounter 
to the Coast Guard, who reported the incident to the 
FBI.
60
 (―Greedy and unscrupulous,‖ Dasch may 
have plotted to keep the money used to finance the 




Upon reaching New York, about 105 miles 
away, Dasch and his three fellow operatives 
checked into the Martinique and Governor Clinton 
Hotels—Heinck and Quirin into the Martinique, 
Dasch and Berger into the Governor Clinton. Dasch 
                                                 
58
 Cullen, as quoted in Persico, Roosevelt's Secret 
War, 200. 
59
 Dasch, as quoted in Ibid. 
60
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 200. 
61
 Farago, The Game of the Foxes, 433. 
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and his partners made the most of their excursion to 
America, ―investing‖ their money in luxury and 
pleasure, ―expensive clothes and fancy 
restaurants.‖62 Among these indulgences was a 
supposed 36-hour pinochle game.
63
  
According to Albert Cox, jailer and 
custodian of the agents following their 
apprehension, Dasch and Ernst Burger had already 
agreed to betray their mission to the FBI after their 
shore landing.
64
 Joseph Persico, in Roosevelt’s 
Secret War, claims the agreement was made later, in 
a ―cautious conversation‖ at the Governor Clinton, 
during which Dasch convinced Burger of their 
mission‘s futility. Dasch, according to Persico, 
allegedly suggested that, if the men turned 
                                                 
62
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 200. 
63
 Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19. 
64
 Ibid., 18. 
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themselves in, they would not only be treated with 
leniency, but even esteem.
65
 Burger, who had once 
endured torture and his pregnant wife‘s miscarriage 
during a 17-month internment in a concentration 
camp at the hands of the Gestapo, probably had few 
qualms about turning himself in.
66
  
As Dasch immersed himself in the high life, 
he was merely buying time for their eventual 
betrayal of the saboteurs‘ mission. He told Burger 
to keep the ―‗two Dutchmen‘‖—what Dasch and 
Burger called their ―less Americanized German 
colleagues‖—at bay as he established contact with 
the FBI.
67
 After attempting to call J. Edgar Hoover, 
Dasch eventually made contact with an FBI agent 
and soon exposed his entire operation to the FBI in 
                                                 
65




 Dasch, as quoted in Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19. 
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full detail at FBI headquarters in Washington, 
D.C.
68
 His three partners waited in New York—
only Burger knew their future. They were 
subsequently apprehended with ease.
69
  
Meanwhile, four days after Dasch and his 
partners had landed on the Long Island shore, the 
second PASTORIUS team—Edward Kerling, 
Herbert Haupt, Hermann Neubauer and Werner 
Thiel—made landfall on Ponte Vedra Beach. Albert 
Cox suggests that, had Dasch not so luxuriated in 
New York, the FBI could have apprehended the 
Florida spy team sooner.
70
 Dasch did divulge the 




                                                 
68
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 201. 
69
 Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19. 
70
 Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19. 
71
 Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War, 201. 
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Dasch‘s and Burger‘s partners showed no 
more devotion to their mission. Herbert Haupt 
traveled to Chicago, where he was to acquire an 
automobile and an employment position at the 
Simpson Optical Company, where he had once 
worked. (Haupt even found time to visit his parents, 
who lived in the city; his parents, uncle and aunt 
were later convicted of treason for providing him 
aid and comfort.
72
) There, he would evaluate the 
plant‘s vulnerabilities and relay his findings to his 
partners, who would sabotage the plant accordingly. 
Observing Haupt since he entered Chicago, federal 
agents apprehended him on June 27, 1942, before 
sabotage plans could be executed. Following his 
                                                 
72
 Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 21. 
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arraignment on July 21, Haupt ―volunteered 
considerable information‖ to two FBI agents.73  
By June 27, seven of the eight agents had 
been apprehended, the last soon to be arrested.
74
 
Nearly all the agents‘ American bills were 
recovered as well. Franklin D. Roosevelt needed 
little time to assess the spies‘ punishment, writing in 
a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle, ―‗The 
two Americans are guilty of treason.‘‖75 Of the 
other six, Roosevelt incorporated a historical 
analogy favorable to his view: ―‗They were 
apprehended in civilian clothes. This is an absolute 
parallel of the Case of Major [John] Andre in the 
Revolution and of Nathan Hale. Both of these men 
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were hanged.‘‖76 Roosevelt concluded with an 
unambiguous decision: ―‗The death penalty is called 
for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war 
aim and the very existence of our American 
government.‘‖77  
Roosevelt personally desired strict legal 
measures against the enemy spies and, through 
forcefulness, was determined to get his way: ―‗I 
want one thing clearly understood, Francis: I won‘t 
give them up…I won‘t hand them over to any 
United States Marshall armed with a writ of habeas 
corpus. Understand!‘‖78 Biddle, who found himself 
―trapped between the President‘s questionable 
pressure and his own reverence for the law,‖ abided 
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and the agents were ultimately tried by military 
tribunal.
79
   
Besides its wartime significance, the 
saboteurs‘ trial set several important precedents. For 
the first time in the history of the Supreme Court, its 
justices were called from their vacations to convene 
―midway through the trial.‖ Not only did this 
assembly alone make history; the trial itself did, as 
well. This was one of the few times that a special 
military commission was ever called upon in the 
nation‘s history. Furthermore, while all Supreme 
Court Justices returned from their vacations, one of 
the nine, Frank Murphy, did not partake in ―that 
strange two-day mid-July sitting.‖80 Albert Cox, the 
agents‘ custodian and thus, acting defendant during 
this brief span, later recalled: 
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Justice Frank Murphy, was then a 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army, stationed at 
Fort Benning. During the proceedings he 
remained in uniform, within earshot but out 
of sight of counsels and spectators, sitting 
behind the curtain which shields the goings 
and comings of the robed Justices between 
their bench and the robing room. This, too, 
must have been unprecedented in the 
Supreme Court‘s annals.81 
 
The trial concluded on August 3, 1942, and the 
PASTORIUS agents were convicted.
82
   
The agents‘ convictions brought more 
scrutiny of the legal status of spies than was present 
before the trial began, for it opened a debate that 
resounds today as the United States weighs similar 
issues with a different enemy: 
Some laymen have expressed the opinion 
that the saboteurs should not have been 
given any sort of trial, that they should have 
been summarily shot just as American 
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agents in Germany would have been. But the 
greatest tests of the principles for which we 
are fighting comes when we must apply 
them to those who would destroy them. 





William P. Armstrong, in his Presidential Address 
to the American Bar Association, expressed similar 
sentiments, with accolades for the manner in which 
justice was carried out without partiality, 
obstruction, or exploitation:  
The recent trial and proceedings in 
connection with the trial of the Nazi 
saboteurs reflected great credit upon the 
nation. It was a practical demonstration that 
we actually believe in the things for which 
we are fighting. The accused were accorded 
the benefit of counsel who were not only 
sworn to defend them, but who, as I can 
testify from personal observation, performed 
that duty in a way that measured up to the 
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finest traditions of the American Bar and 




Evocative of John Adams‘s defense of a 
Redcoat charged for his participation in the Boston 
Massacre (though under different circumstances), 
Armstrong‘s argument advocates America‘s 
adherence to an ideal legal standard—one whose 
application, particularly in wartime, might be called 
into question; it was in 1942, and remains 
controversial today. Arguing that the nation should 
bestow certain rights shared by its own citizens to 
its enemies, Armstrong raises concerns equally 
relevant in the modern world. Armstrong‘s 
interpretation of the legal proceedings corresponds 
with that of Franklin Roosevelt Administration‘s 
public opinion, but Roosevelt‘s personal will lurked 
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in the background. Roosevelt, in fact, ordered the 
military trial proceedings to be kept secret.
85
   
Probing further into the evaluation of the 
military commission itself, one comes upon another 
familiar argument—in this particular case, the 
implications of the Supreme Court‘s decision to 
uphold the agents‘ plea for a writ of habeas corpus 
and a public trial by ―civil authorities.‖86      
When read as a whole, the preliminary 
decision indicates that the court is not going 
to hold that alien enemies have no rights, but 
that modern military developments have 
made it necessary to redefine and even to 




Sounding more like excerpts from a philosophical 
treatise, these evaluations of the Nazi saboteurs‘ 
treatment and trial nonetheless capture the 
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complexity and controversy of how to punish 
threats to America‘s national security, particularly 
in wartime.  
Reading carefully, it would be difficult not 
to notice a parallel between this rhetoric of more 
than six decades past and rhetoric Americans might 
hear today in an age of pronounced terrorism. Thus, 
stepping back from the microscopic view of the 
trial, one discovers its more overarching 
significance. The Nazi saboteur trial not only 
reasserted America‘s legal stance against malicious 
enemy agents; it also laid a foundation for 
contemporary political, judicial and international 
discourse on an issue that has seemingly found little 
resolution since the 1940s: how to legally define 
enemies and try them according to increasingly 
complex—and yet, ambiguous—legal guidelines. 
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On August 8, 1942, saboteurs Edward John 
Kerling, Herbert Hans Haupt, Richard Quirlin, 
Warren Thiel, Hermann Otto Neubauer, and 
Heinrich Harm Hencke were executed by 
electrocution. (Georg Dasch and Ernest Berger were 
found guilty and eventually deported.) Of the 
aftermath, The Chronicler‘s Report for 1942 tersely 
noted: ―The bodies were interred at Blue Plains.‖88  
On a casual glance, this brief statement 
would be the only legacy left by the agents and the 
trial by which they were convicted. However, 
delving into the fascinating account of their 
adventures in America—for a mission whose failure 
seemed all too clear from the start—one discovers a 
remarkable storyline fit for a novel, but with the 
reality of wartime fear, suspicion, and danger. One 
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discovers how an unarmed nineteen-year-old high 
school student can hamper a nation‘s war effort; 
how eight men in a war fought by millions 
fomented anxieties shared by numerous American 
citizens during wartime; and how these men 
inspired legal precedents and bred controversy that 
remains to this day. These are the stories hidden 
behind the popular images and memories of World 
War II, but they are no less important. For behind 
the thundering of artillery fire, the masses of 
opposing armies in relentless struggle, and the 
horrors left in the aftermath of battle lies a war in 
the shadows—the quiet war. 
